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Abstract. We consider a model of opinion formation based on aggregation functions. Each player
modifies his opinion by arbitrarily aggregating the current opinion of all players. A player is influ-
ential for another player if the opinion of the first one matters for the latter. A generalization of
influential player to a coalition whose opinion matters for a player is called influential coalition. In-
fluential players (coalitions) can be graphically represented by the graph (hypergraph) of influence,
and the convergence analysis is based on properties of the hypergraphs of influence. In the paper,
we focus on the practical issues of applicability of the model w.r.t. the standard opinion formation
framework driven by the Markov chain theory. For the qualitative analysis of convergence, knowing
the aggregation functions of the players is not required, but one only needs to know the influential
coalitions for every player. We propose simple algorithms that permit to fully determine the influ-
ential coalitions. We distinguish three cases: the symmetric decomposable model, the anonymous
model, and the general model.
JEL Classification: C7, D7, D85
Keywords: social network, opinion formation, aggregation function, influential coalition,
algorithm
1 Introduction - dynamic models of opinion formation
Opinion formation models are widely studied in psychology, sociology, economics, math-
ematics, computer sciences, among others; for overviews, see, e.g., Jackson (2008), Ace-
moglu and Ozdaglar (2011). A seminal model of opinion formation and imitation has
been introduced in DeGroot (1974). In that model, individuals in a society start with
initial opinions on a subject. The interaction patterns are described by a stochastic ma-
trix whose entry on row j and column k represents the weight ‘that player j places on
the current belief of player k in forming j’s belief for the next period’. The beliefs are
updated over time. A number of works in the network literature deal with the DeGroot
model and its variations. In particular, Jackson (2008) and Golub and Jackson (2010)
investigate a model, in which players update their beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted
averages of their neighbors’ opinions. One of the issues in the DeGroot framework that
these authors deal with concerns necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence of the
social influence matrix and reaching a consensus; see additionally Berger (1981). Jackson
(2008) also examines the speed of convergence of beliefs, and Golub and Jackson (2010)
analyze in the context of the DeGroot model whether consensus beliefs are “correct”,
⋆ The authors acknowledge the support by the National Agency for Research (Agence Nationale de la Recherche),
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i.e., whether the beliefs converge to the right probability, expectation, etc. The authors
consider a sequence of societies, where each society is strongly connected and convergent,
and described by its updating matrix. In each social network of the sequence, the belief
of each player converges to the consensus limit belief. There is a true state of nature, and
the sequence of networks is wise if the consensus limit belief converges in probability to
the true state as the number of societies grows.
Several other generalizations of the DeGroot model can be found in the literature,
e.g., models in which the updating of beliefs can vary in time and circumstances; see
e.g., DeMarzo et al. (2003), Krause (2000), Lorenz (2005), Friedkin and Johnsen (1990,
1997). In the model by DeMarzo et al. (2003), players in a network try to estimate
some unknown parameter which allows updating to vary over time, i.e., a player may
place more or less weight on his own belief over time. The authors study the case of
multidimensional opinions, in which each player has a vector of beliefs. They show that,
in fact, the individuals’ opinions can often be well approximated by a one-dimensional
line, where a player’s position on the line determines his position on all issues. Friedkin
and Johnsen (1990, 1997) study a similar framework, in which social attitudes depend on
the attitudes of neighbors and evolve over time. In their model, players start with initial
attitudes and then mix in some of their neighbors’ recent attitudes with their starting
attitudes.
Also other works in sociology related to influence are worth mentioning, e.g., the
eigenvector-like notions of centrality and prestige (Katz (1953), Bonacich (1987), Bonacich
and Lloyd (2001)), and models of social influence and persuasion by French (1956) and
Harary (1959); see also Wasserman and Faust (1994). A sociological model of interac-
tions on networks is also presented in Conlisk (1976); see also Conlisk (1978, 1992) and
Lehoczky (1980). Conlisk introduces the interactive Markov chain, in which every entry
in a state vector at each time represents the fraction of the population with some at-
tribute. The matrix depends on the current state vector, i.e., the current social structure
is taken into account for evolution in sociological dynamics. In Granovetter (1978) thresh-
old models of collective behavior are discussed. These are models in which agents have
two alternatives and the costs and benefits of each depend on how many other agents
choose which alternative. The author focuses on the effect of the individual thresholds
(i.e., the proportion or number of others that make their decision before a given agent)
on the collective behavior, discusses an equilibrium in a process occurring over time and
the stability of equilibrium outcomes. A certain model of influence is studied in Asa-
vathiratham (2000) and Asavathiratham et al. (2001). The model consists of a network
of nodes, each with a status evolving over time. The evolution of the status is according
to an internal Markov chain, but transition probabilities depend not only on the current
status of the node, but also on the statuses of the neighboring nodes.
Another work on interaction is presented in Hu and Shapley (2003b,a), where authors
apply the command structure of Shapley (1994) to model players’ interaction relations
by simple games. For each player, boss sets and approval sets are introduced, and based
on these sets, a simple game called the command game for a player is built. In Hu and
Shapley (2003a) the authors introduce an authority distribution over an organization
and the (stochastic) power transition matrix, in which an entry in row j and column
k is interpreted as agent j’s “power” transfered to k. The authority equilibrium equa-
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tion is defined. In Hu and Shapley (2003a) multi-step commands are considered, where
commands can be implemented through command channels.
There is also a vast literature on learning in the context of social networks; see
e.g. Banerjee (1992), Ellison (1993), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995), Bala and Goyal
(1998, 2001), Gale and Kariv (2003), Celen and Kariv (2004), Banerjee and Fudenberg
(2004). In general, in social learning models agents observe choices over time and update
their beliefs accordingly, which is different from the models where the choices depend on
the influence of others.
While DeGroot (1974) assumes that players update their opinion by taking weighted
averages of the opinions of all players, Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013) investigate a
model of opinion formation in which players update their beliefs according to arbitrary
aggregation functions. Fo¨rster et al. (2013) study the model of opinion formation in which
ordered weighted averages are used in the opinion updating process. In this paper we come
back to the model of influence based on aggregation functions introduced in Grabisch and
Rusinowska (2013) and discuss the practical issues of applicability of this model w.r.t.
the “standard” opinion formation framework driven by the Markov chain theory.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the basic material on models of
influence based on aggregation functions, establishes the notation and terminology, and
recalls the essential result which is the basis for the determination of the qualitative part
of the influence model. Section 3 addresses the problem of the practical determination
of an influence model and focuses on the determination of its qualitative part, which
is sufficient for a qualitative analysis of convergence. This determination amounts to
identifying influential coalitions, which can be easily obtained by interview of the agents.
We distinguish the case of the symmetric decomposable model (influential coalitions
reduce to individuals), the anonymous model (only the number of agents matters, not
their identity), and the general model. We show how clues on convergence can be obtained
in a simple way, even without determining the reduced transition matrix. Section 4 gives
some concluding remarks.
2 Influence model based on aggregation functions
In this section, we recapitulate the model of influence based on aggregation functions
(Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013)). Consider a set N := {1, . . . , n} of players that have
to make a yes-no decision on a certain issue. Every player has an initial opinion which
may change due to mutual interaction (influence) among players. By bS,T we denote the
probability that the set S of ‘yes’-voters becomes T after one step of influence. We assume
that the process of influence may iterate, and therefore obtain a stochastic influence
process, depicting the evolution of the coalition of ‘yes’-players in time. We assume that
the process is Markovian (bS,T depends on S and T but not on the whole history) and
stationary (bS,T is constant over time). States of this finite Markovian process are all
subsets S ⊆ N representing the set of ‘yes’-players, and we have also the transition
matrix B := [bS,T ]S,T⊆N which is a 2
n × 2n row-stochastic matrix.
3
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For the qualitative description of the convergence of the process, it is sufficient to
know the reduced matrix B˜ given by
b˜S,T =
{
1, if bS,T > 0
0, otherwise.
and equivalently represented by the transition graph Γ = (2N , E), where E is the set
of arcs, its vertices are all possible coalitions, and an arc (S, T ) from state S to state T
exists if and only if b˜S,T = 1.
Definition 1. An n-place aggregation function is a mapping A : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] satisfying
(i) A(0, . . . , 0) = 0, A(1, . . . , 1) = 1 (boundary conditions)
(ii) If x ≤ x′ then A(x) ≤ A(x′) (nondecreasingness).
To every player i ∈ N we associate an aggregation function Ai, which specifies the
way player i modifies his opinion from the opinions of the players. Let A := (A1, . . . , An)
denote the vector of aggregation functions. We compute A(1S) = (A1(1S), . . . , An(1S)),
where 1S is the characteristic vector of S, and Ai(1S) indicates the probability of player
i to say ‘yes’ at next step when the set of agents saying ’yes’ is S. We assume that these
probabilities are independent among agents, hence the probability of transition from the
yes-coalition S to the yes-coalition T is given by
bS,T =
∏
i∈T
Ai(1S)
∏
i6∈T
(1− Ai(1S)). (1)
A detailed study of the convergence of the model is provided in Grabisch and Rusi-
nowska (2013). It is shown in particular that three types of terminal class1 can exist:
singletons, cycles, and regular terminal classes. The first case is when the class is reduced
to a single coalition (called terminal state), the second one is the case where no conver-
gence occurs because the process endlessly cycles on a sequence of coalitions, and the last
case is when the class is a Boolean lattice of the form {S ∈ 2N | K ⊆ S ⊆ L} for some
sets K,L. In any case, N and ∅ are terminal states (called trivial terminal states).
We emphasize two particular aggregation functions. The first one is the well-known
weighted arithmetic mean (WAM), defined by
WAMw(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
wixi
where w = (w1, . . . , wn) is a weight vector, i.e., w ∈ [0, 1]
n with the property
∑n
i=1wi =
1. The weighted arithmetic mean is used in most models of opinion formation, e.g.,
the DeGroot model. Another remarkable aggregation function is the ordered weighted
arithmetic mean (OWA) (Yager (1988)), defined by
OWAw(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
wix(i)
1 A class is a maximal collection of coalitions such that for any two distinct coalitions S, T in the class, there
exists a sequence of transitions inside the class leading from S to T . The class is terminal if no transition to
go outside the class is possible.
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where w is a weight vector, and the inputs have been reordered decreasingly: x(1) ≥ · · · ≥
x(n). Note that unlike the case of WAM, weights do not bear on inputs but on the rank
of the inputs, so that the minimum and the maximum are particular cases, by taking
respectively w = (0, . . . , 0, 1) and w = (1, 0, . . . , 0). Applied to our context of influence
where the input vectors are binary, if every agent aggregates the opinions by an OWA, we
obtain an anonymous influence model, because each agent updates his opinion according
to the number of agents saying ’yes’, not to which agent says ’yes’. Anonymous influence
models have been studied in detail in Fo¨rster et al. (2013).
Definition 2. Let Ai be the aggregation function of agent i. A nonempty coalition S ⊆ N
is yes-influential for i if
(i) Ai(1S) > 0
(ii) For all S ′ ⊂ S, Ai(1S′) = 0.
Similarly, a coalition S is no-influential for i if
(i) Ai(1N\S) < 1
(ii) For all S ′ ⊂ S, Ai(1N\S′) = 1.
We denote by Cyesi and C
no
i the collections of yes- and no-influential coalitions for i.
Coalition S is yes-influential for player i if, when players in S say ‘yes’ and every other
player says ‘no’, i has a positive probability to say ‘yes’ (and similarly for no-influential
coalitions). Moreover, S has no superfluous player. If an influential coalition is formed by
only one player, then we call it influential player. Note that these collections are never
empty, since in case no proper subcoalition of N is yes- or no-influential, N would be
both yes- and no-influential, by Definition 1. More importantly, each such collection is
an antichain in 2N , that is, for any distinct S, S ′ members of the collection, S 6⊂ S ′ and
S ′ 6⊂ S.
Influential players can easily be represented in a directed graph. Define Gyes
A
, the graph
of yes-influence, as follows: the set of nodes is the set of agents N , and there is an arc
(j, i) from j to i if j is yes-influential for i. The graph of no-influence Gno
A
is defined
similarly. The representation of influential coalitions require the more complex notion of
hypergraph.
Definition 3. We define the following concepts:
(i) A hypergraph (Berge, 1976) H is a pair (N, E) where N is the set of nodes and E the
set of hyperedges, where an hyperedge S ∈ E is a nonempty subset of N . If |S| = 2 for
all S ∈ E , then we have a classical graph.
(ii) A directed hypergraph on N is a hypergraph on N where each hyperedge S is an
ordered pair (S ′, S ′′) (called an hyperarc from S ′ to S ′′), with S ′, S ′′ being nonempty
and S ′ ∪ S ′′ = S.
(iii) A directed hyperpath from i to j is a sequence i0S1i1S2i2 · · · iq−1Sqiq, where i0 :=
i, i1, . . . , iq−1, j =: iq are nodes, S1 = (S
′
1, S
′′
1 ), . . . , Sq = (S
′
q, S
′′
q ) are hyperarcs such
that S ′k ∋ ik−1 and S
′′
k ∋ ik for all k = 1, . . . , q.
We define the hypergraphs Hyes
A
, Hno
A
of yes-influence and no-influence as follows. For
H
yes
A
, the set of nodes is N , and there is an hyperarc (C, {i}) for each C ∈ Cyesi (similarly
for Hno
A
).
5
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Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013) prove that the hypergraphs Hyes
A
, Hno
A
(equivalently,
the collections Cyesi and C
no
i for all i ∈ N) are equivalent to the reduced matrix B˜, and
therefore contain the entire qualitative description of the convergence.
Theorem 1. Consider an influence process B based on aggregation functions A. Then
B˜ can be reconstructed from the hypergraphs Hyes
A
and Hno
A
as follows: for any S, T ∈ 2N ,
b˜S,T = 1 if and only if
(i) For each i ∈ T , there exists a nonempty S ′i ⊆ S such that S
′
i is yes-influential on i,
i.e., S ′i ∈ C
yes
i ; and
(ii) For each i 6∈ T , there exists a nonempty S ′′i such that S
′′
i ∩ S = ∅ and S
′′
i is no-
influential on i, i.e., S ′′i ∈ C
no
i .
In particular, b˜∅,T = 0 for all T 6= ∅, b∅,∅ = 1, and b˜N,T = 0 for all T 6= N , bN,N = 1.
Recall that (1) is valid only if the probabilities of saying ’yes’ are independent among the
agents. Therefore, the presence of correlation among the agents makes the determination
of the transition matrix difficult. However, B˜ is insensitive to possible correlation among
agents, because b˜S,T = 1 if and only if Ai(1S) > 0 for every i ∈ T and Ai(1S) < 1 for
every i 6∈ T , regardless of the correlation among agents.
3 Determination of the model
An important issue concerns the determination of an influence model of the above type
in a practical situation. This implies that we are making essentially two assumptions:
1) Every agent aggregates the opinion of all agents to form his opinion in the next step.
2) The aggregation function is monotonically increasing.
The latter assumption implies that anti-conformist behaviors (i.e., the more individuals
say ’yes’, the more I am inclined to say ’no’) cannot be modeled in this framework.
3.1 General considerations
A complete determination of the model amounts either to identifying the transition matrix
B or all aggregation functions A1, . . . , An (supposing absence of correlation). Considering
the size of the matrix B (2n × 2n), a statistical determination of B seems to be nearly
impossible, unless making a huge amount of observations. As for the determination of the
aggregation functions, the situation is even worse, since questioning the agents about the
aggregation functions (type, parameters) appears to be quite unrealistic. We know from
Section 2 that the knowledge of the reduced matrix B˜ is enough to obtain a qualitative
description of the convergence of the model, which is insensitive to possible correlations
among agents. Moreover, the knowledge of B˜ (size 22n) is equivalent by Theorem 1 to
the knowledge of the collections of all yes- and no-influential coalitions (size at most
2n
(
n
⌊n
2
⌋
)
), which is in turn equivalent to the knowledge of the hypergraphs of yes- and
no-influence. In some favorable cases (e.g., the WAM model), the hypergraphs reduce to
ordinary graphs. This immediately indicates two ways of identifying the (qualitative part
of the) model: either by observation of the transitions, i.e., the evolution of the coalition
of the ’yes’ agents, or by interview of the agents. In the first case, observing a transition
6
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from S to T yields b˜ST = 1. In the second case, the interview permits to determine the
influential coalitions or the graphs of influence.
In the rest of this section, we mainly focus on the second approach. Concerning the
first one, we only mention an important fact. The underlying assumptions of the model
make that the reduced matrix B˜ is not arbitrary and has specific properties. Recall that
b˜ST = 1 if and only if for all i ∈ T , Ai(1S) > 0 and for all i 6∈ T , Ai(1S) < 1. This implies
the following fact:
Fact 1 For a given S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, N , the candidates transitions are all sets of the form
T = K ∪ L, where
K = {i ∈ N | Ai(1S) = 1}
L ⊆ {i ∈ N | 0 < Ai(1S) < 1}.
Put otherwise,
⋂
T , the intersection of all possible transitions from S yields the set
K = {i ∈ N | Ai(1S) = 1}, while N \
⋃
T yields K ′ = {i ∈ N | Ai(1S) = 0}.
When S increases, K increases while K ′ decreases. This fact permits to detect, when B˜
is constructed from observations, possible deviations from the model (e.g., presence of
anti-conformists).
3.2 Determination of influential coalitions
We may distinguish three cases, according to the type of underlying model:
(i) WAM model (symmetric decomposable model): all aggregation functions are weighted
arithmetic means;
(ii) OWA model (anonymous model): all aggregation functions are ordered weighted av-
erages;
(iii) general model (no special assumption).
The symmetric decomposable model. The case of the WAM model is particularly simple
and has been studied in depth in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013). It has been proved to
be equivalent to a symmetric decomposable model. An aggregation model is decomposable
if for every agent i ∈ N , every yes- and no-influential coalition for agent i is a singleton.
Now, an aggregation model is symmetric if a yes-influential coalition for i is also no-
influential for i and vice versa, for every i ∈ N . Note that the first property implies that
the hypergraphs of yes- and no-influence reduce to ordinary graphs, while the second
property implies that the two graphs are identical, and therefore the whole (qualitative)
model is represented by a single graph of influence. This makes the interview of the agents
particularly simple: it suffices to ask to every agent to whom he asks advice. Then, i asks
advice to j is translated in the graph of influence by an arc from j to i.
In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013), we have applied this technique to a real case,
namely the manager network of Krackhardt (Krackhardt (1987)). The agents are the
21 managers of a small manufacturing firm in the USA, and the network is obtained as
follows: each agent k is asked if he/she thinks that agent i asks advice to agent j. Then
an arc from j to i is put in the graph of influence if a majority of agents thinks that i asks
advice to j. From the graph, and due to the properties of symmetric decomposable models,
many conclusions can be easily drawn on the convergence of the model. In particular,
7
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it is possible to detect the presence of regular terminal classes (Theorem 8 in Grabisch
and Rusinowska (2013)). There is also a simple criterion to know if there is no regular
terminal class: it suffices that for each agent i, every agent outside cl(i) receives an arc in
the influence graph from cl(i), where cl(i), the closure of i, is the set of agents who can
reach i by a path in the influence graph.
The anonymous model. In the OWA model, agents do not change their opinion due to
particular individuals, but due to the number of individuals saying ’yes’. Therefore, in
general these are not decomposable models, and one needs to determine influential coali-
tions as in the general case. However, because these models are anonymous, a collection
Cyesi or C
no
i is composed of all sets of a given size s, 1 ≤ s ≤ n, and this is characteristic
of an anonymous model. Therefore, under the assumption of anonymity, it suffices to ask
to every agent i:
Q1: Suppose that your opinion on some question is ’yes’. What is the minimal
number of agents saying ’no’ that may make you change your opinion?
Q2: Suppose that your opinion on some question is ’no’. What is the minimal
number of agents saying ’yes’ that may make you change your opinion?
Assuming that the answers are respectively s and s′, it follows that
Cnoi = {S ∈ 2
N | |S| = s}, Cyesi = {S ∈ 2
N | |S| = s′}.
Now, it is easy to see that given s, s′ for agent i, one can get the form of the weight vector
w in the aggregation function OWAw of agent i (Proposition 2 in Fo¨rster et al. (2013)):
w = (0 0 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
s′−1 zeros
, • • · · · •, 0 0 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
s−1 zeros
),
where “•” indicates any nonzero weight. In particular, all agents are yes-influential (re-
spectively, no-influential) for i if and only if w1 > 0 (respectively, wn > 0).
As for the convergence of the model, it is shown in Fo¨rster et al. (2013) (Proposition 3)
that no cycle can occur, but the two other types of terminal classes may occur. Terminal
states are easily detected as follows: S of size s is a terminal state if and only if for every
i ∈ S, the size of a no-influential coalition is at least n− s + 1, and for every i 6∈ S, the
size of a yes-influential coalition is at least s+ 1. The absence of regular terminal classes
can also be characterized only through influential coalitions, but the condition is more
complex (see Corollary 3 in the aforementioned paper).
The general model. We address now the general case, where no special assumption is made
on the model, except the following: we assume that each agent is yes- and no-influential
on himself, which means that Ai(1i) > 0, Ai(1N\i) < 1 (in other words, the agent trusts
his opinion to a nonnull extent). This induces some simplification in the algorithm, but
it would not be difficult to generalize it in order to overcome this limitation.
Interview for Agent i
0. Set Cyesi = {{i}}, C
no
i = {{i}}, N
yes
i = N
no
i = 2
N\i.
% N yesi ,N
no
i are the sets of candidate coalitions.
1. For each agent j ∈ N , j 6= i, do:
8
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1.1. If {j} 6∈ N noi , GO TO Step 1.2, otherwise ask:
Q: Suppose that your opinion on some question is ’yes’. Would you be inclined to
change your opinion if Agent j would say ’no’ ?
If the answer is positive:
– add {j} in Cnoi , and discard from N
no
i all sets containing j.
– If N noi = ∅ or if |C
no
i | =
(
n
⌊n
2
⌋
)
, STOP (GO TO STEP 2).
Otherwise, discard {j} from N noi , and ask:
1.2 Q: In the list {S ∈ N noi | S ∋ j}
2, could you tell me the first coalition that may
make change your opinion if the agents in that coalition would say ’no’?
If some set S is answered:
– add S in Cnoi , discard S, all sets listed before S and all supersets of S in N
no
i .
– If N noi = ∅ or if |C
no
i | =
(
n
⌊n
2
⌋
)
, STOP (GO TO STEP 2).
– Go to Step 1.2 again.
Otherwise, discard all sets containing j in N noi . If N
no
i = ∅, STOP (GO TO STEP
2), otherwise proceed to next agent (Step 1).
2. Exactly like Step 1 for Cyesi . Question 1.1. becomes: Suppose that your opinion on
some question is ’no’. Would you be inclined to change your opinion if Agent j would say
’yes’?, etc.
We give some examples.
Example 1. (braces are omitted for coalitions) Consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. We detail the
interview for Agent 1.
(i) We have Cno1 = {1}. We take Agent 2.
Suppose that your opinion on some question is ’yes’. Would you be inclined to
change your opinion if Agent 2 would say ’no’ ?
Yes. Hence, Cno1 = {1, 2}, and N
no
1 = {3, 4, 5, 34, 35, 45, 345}.
(ii) Agent 3.
Suppose that your opinion on some question is ’yes’. Would you be inclined to
change your opinion if Agent 3 would say ’no’ ?
Answer: No. N no1 = {4, 5, 34, 35, 45, 345}. Next question:
In the list {34, 35, 345}, could you tell me the first coalition that may make
change your opinion if they would say ’no’?
Answer: 34. Then Cnoi = {1, 2, 34}, and N
no
1 = {5, 35, 45}.
In the list {35}, could you tell me the first coalition that may make change your
opinion if they would say ’no’?
Answer: None. N no1 = {5, 45}.
(iii) Agent 4.
In the list {45}, could you tell me the first coalition that may make change your
opinion if they would say ’no’?
Answer: None. Then N no1 = {5}.
(iv) Agent 5.
Suppose that your opinion on some question is ’yes’. Would you be inclined to
change your opinion if Agent 5 would say ’no’ ?
Answer: No. N no1 = ∅. STOP.
2 The list must be ordered by inclusion.
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Finally, Cnoi = {1, 2, 34}. We do the same for C
yes
1 .
(i) Agent 2:
Suppose that your opinion on some question is ’no’. Would you be inclined to
change your opinion if Agent 2 would say ’yes’ ?
Answer: No. N yes1 = {3, 4, 5, 23, 24, 25, 34, 35, 45, 234, 235, 245, 345, 2345}.
In the list {23, 24, 25, 234, 235, 245, 2345}, could you tell me the first coalition
that may make change your opinion if they would say ’no’?
Answer: 234. Then Cyes1 = {1, 234}, N
yes
1 = {5, 35, 45, 235, 245, 345}.
In the list {235, 245}, could you tell me the first coalition that may make change
your opinion if they would say ’no’?
Answer: 235. Then Cyes1 = {1, 234, 235}, N
yes
1 = {45, 245, 345}.
In the list {245}, could you tell me the first coalition that may make change
your opinion if they would say ’no’?
Answer: 245. Then Cyes1 = {1, 234, 235, 245}, N
yes
1 = {45, 345}.
(ii) Agent 3:
Suppose that your opinion on some question is ’no’. Would you be inclined to
change your opinion if Agent 3 would say ’yes’ ?
Answer: No.
In the list {345}, could you tell me the first coalition that may make change
your opinion if they would say ’no’?
Answer: 345. Then Cyes1 = {1, 234, 235, 245, 345}, N
yes
1 = ∅. STOP.
We give now another example to illustrate how the reduced transition matrix B˜ can
be obtained through Theorem 1 from the influential coalitions. To this end, we suppose
that the foregoing algorithm has been applied to each agent in order to obtain all influ-
ential coalitions. The condition that every agent is self-influential permits to simplify the
application of the theorem for the determination of every term b˜ST . Indeed, the following
facts are easy to show.
Fact 2 Suppose that {i} ∈ Cyesi and {i} ∈ C
no
i for every i ∈ N . Then:
(i) b˜SS = 1 for every S ∈ 2
N ;
(ii) If T ⊆ S, condition (i) in Theorem 1 is always satisfied for checking b˜ST = 1; more-
over, if b˜ST = 0, then b˜ST ′ = 0 for every T
′ ⊂ T ;
(iii) If T ⊇ S, condition (ii) in Theorem 1 is always satisfied for checking b˜ST = 1;
moreover, if b˜ST = 0, then b˜ST ′ = 0 for every T
′ ⊃ T ;
(iv) If in addition, {i} is the only singleton in Cyesi , b˜{i}S = 0 for every S 6= {i}.
Example 2. Consider a society N = {1, 2, 3, 4} of 4 agents. Suppose that the following
collections have been obtained (braces are omitted for coalitions):
Cno1 = {1, 2, 34}, C
yes
1 = {1, 234}
Cno2 = {2, 34}, C
yes
2 = {2, 134}
Cno3 = {2, 3}, C
yes
3 = {3, 12}
Cno4 = {12, 4}, C
yes
4 = {4}
Observe that agent 4 is stubborn for ’yes’ (no influence is possible when agent 4 thinks
’yes’).
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Let us apply Theorem 1. Using Fact 2, one easily finds that b˜ST = 1 only for the
following S, T (braces omitted):
S = 1 : T = ∅, 1
S = 2 : T = ∅, 2
S = 3 : T = ∅, 3
S = 4 : T = ∅, 4
S = 12 : T = ∅, 1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 23, 123
S = 13 : T = ∅, 1, 3, 13
S = 14 : T = 4, 14
S = 23 : T = 23
S = 24 : T = 24
S = 34 : T = ∅, 3, 4, 34
S = 123 : T = 123
S = 124 : T = 124, 1234
S = 134 : T = 4, 14, 24, 34, 124, 134, 234, 1234
S = 234 : T = 234, 1234.
One can check that Fact 1 is satisfied. The corresponding transition graph Γ is given on
Figure 1 below. It is seen that, apart from the trivial terminal classes, 23, 24 and 123 are
∅
1 2 3 4
12 13 14 23 24 34
123 124 134 234
1234
Fig. 1. Transition graph (loops are omitted). Terminal states are in red and larger font
terminal states. There is no regular nor cyclic class.
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We show now that it is possible to get conclusions on the convergence without comput-
ing B˜, by the sole examination of the hypergraphs, thanks to results shown in Grabisch
and Rusinowska (2013). To this end, we need the notion of ingoing hyperarc. We say that
a coalition S has an ingoing hyperarc (T ′, T ′′) in hypergraph H if T ′ ⊆ N \S and T ′′ ⊆ S
(and vice versa for outgoing).
Now, Theorem 3 in the aforementioned paper establishes that a nonempty S 6= N is a
terminal state if and only if S has no ingoing arc in the hypergraph (Hˆyes
A
)∗ ∪ Hˆno
A
, where
()∗ indicates that the hyperarcs have been inverted, and Hˆ indicates that only normal
hyperarcs are considered3.
This result can be translated in terms of influential collections as follows:
Fact 3 A nonempty S 6= N is a terminal state if and only if
(i) For every i 6∈ S, there is no T ∈ Cyesi such that T ⊆ S;
(ii) For every i ∈ S, there is no T ∈ Cnoi such that T ∩ S = ∅.
Applying this fact to Example 2, we find indeed that the only terminal states are 23, 24
and 123.
4 Concluding remarks
We have shown how in a practical situation one can determine an influence model based
on aggregation functions. An exact determination, yielding the type and parameters of
the aggregation function of every agent, appears to be out of reach without using heavy
procedures. What we show is that, on the contrary, it is easy to obtain the “qualitative
part” of the model, which permits a full qualitative analysis of the convergence of opinions,
that is, to determine all terminal classes. This is sufficient to predict if a consensus will
occur, or if on the contrary, a dichotomy of the society will appear, or a cycle will appear,
etc. Simple criteria are available to detect terminal states or the presence of regular
terminal classes, without even determining the reduced transition matrix. We believe
that this study will make the use of aggregation functions-based models of influence
more familiar and easier to use.
3 A hyperarc (T ′, T ′′) is normal if T ′∩T ′′ = ∅. Note that due to our assumption that every player is self-influential,
all hyperarcs are normal.
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